A recent Supreme Court judgment stating that money demanded on account of financial stringency or to meet urgent domestic expenses does not constitute dowry has serious repercussions for ongoing and future dowry-related cases.
The giving and taking of dowry was made punishable by the Dowry Prohibition Act in 1961. However, the practice of dowry continued to flourish and even extended into communities where the custom was not traditionally prevalent. The advent of more and more goods into the market fed into the practice. The nature of items in dowry changed from buffaloes, bicycles and transistors to motorcycles, refrigerators, televisions and cars.
In fact, the increasing number of dowry deaths led to the constitution of a joint committee of both houses of Parliament which proposed certain amendments in 1983. Reflecting on the role of law, the committee quotes Jawaharlal Nehru: “Legislation cannot by itself normally solve the deep-rooted social problems. One has to approach them in other ways too, but legislation is necessary and essential, so that it may give that push and have that educative factor as well as the legal sanctions behind it which help the public opinion to be given a certain shape.”
The role of judicial decisions is somewhat similar. The judiciary, while interpreting provisions, has to bear in mind the social evil or issue sought to be tackled, the objective sought to be achieved, and the remedy formulated by the legislation. Judges also have to take on board a review by Parliament of the working of the statute and subsequent attempts to remedy flaws or defects and devise newer provisions. In contrast to ‘literal’ interpretations, a construction that furthers the objectives has to be preferred, more so in the case of laws brought in to curb pernicious social ills and evils like untouchability and dowry.
It is in this context that it is important to look at the Supreme Court’s recent decision (January 2007) in the case of Appasaheb versus State of Maharashtra, 2007 (1) SCALE 50, on the important issue of offences related to dowry.
At the time of the marriage of Bhimabai to Appasaheb, a sum of Rs 5,000 and some gold ornaments were given to the family of the bridegroom. After her marriage, Bhimabai was treated well for around six months. Thereafter, Appasaheb and his mother Kadubai started asking Bhimabai to bring Rs 1,000-1,200 from her parents to meet the household expenses and to buy manure. Whenever Bhimabai went to her parents’ home she used to tell them that her husband and her mother-in-law were harassing her and would occasionally even beat her.
Bhimabai’s father and relatives went to Appasaheb’s house and tried to persuade them not to ill-treat Bhimabai. Subsequently, Bhimabai was treated well for about four months. Then the harassment began all over again. A few days before the festival of Nag Panchami, Bhimabai visited her parents’ home and complained that her husband and mother-in-law were not giving her adequate food, clothing and footwear. She also said that her husband had asked her to return with Rs 1,000-1,200 to meet the household expenses and the cost of buying manure.
On the evening of September 15, 1991, Bhimabai’s father Tukaram was told that his daughter was unwell. Tukaram and his relatives immediately went to the in-laws’ house. There they saw Bhimabai lying dead with froth coming out of her mouth, indicating that she may have consumed poison. The police lodged a report of accidental death and the body was sent for post-mortem.
On September 16, 1991, Tukaram lodged a First Information Report (FIR) on the incident. A case of dowry death (Section 304 B of the Indian Penal Code [IPC]), abetment to suicide (Section 306 of the IPC) and cruelty to a woman by her husband or his relatives (Section 498 A of the IPC) was registered against Appasaheb and his mother Kadubai.
Following an investigation, a chargesheet was submitted against the husband and mother-in-law. The sessions judge framed charges for dowry death, abetment to suicide, and subjecting a woman to cruelty. The prosecution examined six witnesses and placed documentary material to establish the case. The sessions judge convicted the husband and mother-in-law for dowry death, under Section 304 B of the IPC, and sentenced them to seven years’ rigorous imprisonment. However, the judge acquitted them of the charges of abetment to suicide and cruelty to a woman, under Sections 306 and 498 A of the IPC, respectively.
Appasaheb and the mother-in-law’s appeal against a conviction for dowry death was dismissed by the Bombay High Court in February 2005. Following the dismissal, the matter reached the Supreme Court on an appeal filed by the husband and mother-in-law against the conviction for dowry death.
The Supreme Court noted that the post-mortem report did not find any sign of external or internal injury; it stated that the cause of death was insecticide poisoning. The court examined the evidence of the father and mother. It noted that the mother had deposed that Bhimabai had complained of ill-treatment by her husband and mother-in-law, accompanied by demands for money from the parental home. That on the last visit before her death, on the occasion of Nag Panchami, Bhimabai complained again of ill-treatment and beatings for not bringing money from her parents. The court noted that the father had said that his daughter had complained of harassment due to “domestic reasons”. That the mother had said that her daughter was being ill-treated for not fulfilling the demand for money to meet household expenses and the cost of buying manure, etc.
The judgment observes that the mother’s statement to the police, recorded on September 16, 1991, did not mention that the cause for ill-treatment was “a demand for money and consequent beating”. However, Bhimabai’s mother deposed before the sessions court that she had clearly told the police that the ill-treatment was due to non-fulfilment of the demand for money. The Supreme Court judgment observes that the accused are from a humble background and could not have exerted any kind of influence on the police to omit the statement.
After the above observations, the Supreme Court accepts the statements of the mother and father of the deceased Bhimabai and observes that the “utmost which can be said is that the appellant No 1 had asked his wife Bhimabai to bring money for meeting domestic expenses and for purchasing manure”. The judgment goes on to examine the ingredients of the offence of a dowry death. It notes that the death of a woman should have been caused by burns or bodily injury, or occurred otherwise than under normal circumstances and that she should have been subjected to cruelty or harassment in connection with a demand for dowry.
Thereafter, the judgment examines the Dowry Prohibition Act and observes that the giving or taking of property, directly or indirectly, should have a connection with the marriage of the parties for it to constitute ‘dowry’. The court notes that the provision for dowry death is a penal provision and therefore the definition of dowry should be construed narrowly. The judgment further declares that the principle of interpretation to be followed is that if an Act is passed with reference to a particular trade, business or transaction, then the words in the legislation should be construed as having the same meaning as generally understood in that trade, business or transaction.
Observing that “dowry is a fairly well-known social custom or practice in India,” the judgment indicates that the definition of ‘dowry’ should be construed as having a meaning that is generally understood. The judgment lays down that a “demand for money on account of some financial stringency or for meeting some urgent domestic expenses or for purchasing manure cannot be termed as a demand for dowry as the said word is normally understood”.
Applying the law laid down to the facts of the present case, the judgment observes that the evidence adduced by the prosecution does not show any demand for ‘dowry’ being made, as money to meet domestic expenses and to purchase manure was asked for by the accused persons. The essential ingredient of a demand for dowry was held to be not established in the case, and the husband and mother-in-law were acquitted of the charge of dowry death. Noting that the trial court had acquitted the accused for the offences of abetment to suicide and cruelty to a woman by her husband or relatives, under Sections 306 and 498 A of the IPC respectively, and observing that the State had not filed any appeal against the acquittal, the Supreme Court refused to go into the question of culpability for the offences under these sections. The court directed the release forthwith of the husband and discharged the sureties and bonds of the mother-in-law who was already on bail.
The Dowry Prohibition Act was brought in with the objective of prohibiting the evil practice of giving or taking dowry. It was felt that making the practice punishable would contribute to its eradication. However, the “ever-increasing and disturbing proportions” of dowry caused concern, and a joint committee of the houses of Parliament was constituted to examine the question of the working of the Dowry Prohibition Act. This led to the insertion of Section 498 A in the Indian Penal Code which made cruelty towards a woman by her husband or his relatives punishable with three years’ imprisonment, by an amendment in 1983.
The initial definition had the requirement that property or valuable security should have been given “as consideration for the marriage of the said parties” for the act to constitute dowry. The working of the Act showed that it was extremely difficult to establish in court that things had been given as “consideration” for the marriage. Concern about devising a means to tackle the menace of dowry led to the substitution of the phrase “as consideration for the marriage” by the wider phrase “in connection with marriage”, through an amendment in 1984. Similarly, the definition of dowry contained the phrase “at or before or after the marriage,” referring to the time when things were given. Again, in a bid to plug loopholes, in 1986 the phrase “at any time after the marriage” was substituted with “after the marriage” to make the definition more inclusive.
In 1986, in an attempt to check dowry harassment, the offence of dowry death was created by introducing Section 304 B in the Indian Penal Code which provides for a minimum of seven years’ imprisonment in case of the unnatural death of a woman within seven years of marriage. Similarly Sections 113 A and 113 B, providing for presumptions against the husband or his relatives in cases of abetment to suicide and dowry death, were introduced into the Evidence Act in 1983 and 1986 respectively.
Ever since Independence there has been concern and distress with regard to the murdering of women for dowry, or harassing them to the point of suicide. The enactment of the Dowry Prohibition Act in 1961, a review of the workings of the Act, suggestions and amendments in the definition of dowry, the creation of the offences of dowry death and cruelty towards women within seven years of marriage, and insertions introducing presumption with regard to abetment to suicide and dowry death in the law of evidence are all part of serious attempts by society and Parliament to check dowry-related crimes.
It is against this background that the provisions of an enactment like the Dowry Prohibition Act and dowry death offences are to be interpreted by courts of law. Unfortunately, in the present case, the Supreme Court seems to have disregarded the entire context — the social evil to be tackled, the objective sought to be achieved, the continuing number of horrific cases of dowry death/suicide, and attempts at devising more effective provisions — and gone in for an interpretation totally at odds with the whole purpose of the legislation. Rather than looking at the enactment as social reform legislation, the judgment equates it with legislation in the area of any trade, business or transaction.
The law declared by the Supreme Court that money demanded on account of financial stringency, or to meet urgent domestic expenses or purchase manure is not dowry is binding on all courts in India. This retrograde judgment has serious repercussions for ongoing and future dowry-related cases, as well as attempts to check the menace of dowry harassment, death and suicide. It needs to be reviewed at the earliest by a larger bench of the court.
