How does one interpret the expression “husband” in the context of the offences of cruelty and dowry demands, in cases where the validity of the marriage is in question?
In the case of Savitaben Somabhai Bhatiya versus State of Gujarat, AIR 2005 SC 1809, the Supreme Court laid down that a second wife, despite her husband’s concealment of his first marriage, cannot be called a “wife” and is not entitled to maintenance under the Criminal Procedure Code. The Delhi High Court, in Narinder Pal Kaur Chawla versus M S Chawla, 148 (2008) Delhi Law Times 522 (DB), declared that a second wife duped by the husband through concealment of his first marriage can be treated as a legally wedded “Hindu wife” and is entitled to claim maintenance under the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act. The Supreme Court, in Reema Aggarwal versus Anupam, AIR 2004 SC 1418, had to deal with the question of interpreting the expression “husband” in the context of the offences of dowry death and cruelty in a case where the validity of the marriage was in question.
Reema got married to Anupam on January 25, 1998; it was the second marriage for both. On June 13, 1998, Reema consumed poison and was admitted to Tagore Hospital, Jallandhar. According to her, Anupam, his mother, father and brother harassed her for not bringing in enough dowry. On June 13, 1998, all four forced an acidic substance into Reema’s mouth to kill her. Reema began vomiting and was taken to hospital in an unconscious state. A case of attempt to murder, under Section 307 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC), and subjecting a woman to cruelty by her husband and relatives in connection with a demand for dowry, under Section 498A of the IPC, was registered against Anupam and the in-laws.
It was argued on behalf of the accused that both provisions of the IPC — Section 304B dealing with dowry death and Section 498A dealing with cruelty — presuppose a valid marriage between the victim-woman and the offender-husband. Therefore, it was required to be established whether the victim was indeed the legally married wife of the accused. It was submitted that Reema had married Anupam while his first wife was still alive and that the prosecution had not put forward any material to demonstrate that the first marriage stood dissolved. The validity of the second marriage to Reema, therefore, was not established.
The trial court held that the offence of attempt to murder, under Section 307 of the IPC, was not established. It accepted the submission on behalf of the accused that the validity of Reema’s marriage to Anupam was not established and acquitted the accused of the offence of cruelty by husband and relatives, under Section 498A of the IPC. The Punjab and Haryana High Court dismissed an appeal against the acquittal of the accused, and the matter reached the Supreme Court.
It was submitted on behalf of Reema that the expression “husband” and “woman”, in Section 498A of the IPC, are to be interpreted and read in a manner so as to give effect to the purpose for which the provision — making the subjection of a woman to cruelty for dowry punishable — was enacted into law in 1983. The accused submitted that to constitute a marriage in the eyes of the law it had to be first established that the marriage was valid. That the Hindu Marriage Act stipulates the conditions of a valid marriage, the circumstances in which marriage becomes void, and makes provisions to provide protection to children of void and voidable marriages. It was argued that where the legislature wanted to provide for contingencies it had made a specific provision, as in the case of Section 16 of the Marriage Act which deems children of void and voidable marriages to be legitimate regardless of the marriage being declared null and void. Section 498A of the IPC uses the expression “husband or the relative of the husband” and does not contain any such provision with respect to an invalid marriage. The contention made was that marriage is the legal union of a man and a woman as husband and wife and cannot extend to a woman whose marriage is void and not a valid marriage in the eyes of the law.
The Supreme Court observed that the concept of marriage to constitute the relationship of “husband” and “wife” may require strict interpretation where claims for civil rights and property are concerned, but does not preclude a different approach when the question of curbing a social evil is concerned. Giving the example of the Dowry Prohibition Act 1961, the court observed that it is a piece of social legislation that aims to check the growing menace of the evil of dowry. In addition to receiving dowry, the very demand for dowry “at or before or after the marriage” has been made punishable. The court held that purposive interpretation that furthers the intention of the legislature to curb a social evil should be preferred to a technical legalistic approach which would sabotage the working of the legislation. Marriage, in this context, would include proposed marriage, particularly in a situation where non-fulfilment of the demand for dowry leads to the wedding not taking place at all.
The judgment observes that the purpose of introducing provisions like Section 304B of the IPC dealing with dowry death, Section 498A of the IPC dealing with cruelty by husband and relatives, and Section 113-B of the Indian Evidence Act laying down presumption in case of dowry death has to be taken into account during interpretation. Legislation enacted to effectuate a public purpose and curb a social evil needs to be interpreted with an element of realism, “not merely pedantically or hyper technically”. The objective of bringing in these provisions is to prevent harassment of a woman who enters a marital relationship and then becomes a victim of the greed for money.
A hair-splitting legalistic approach that allows a person who enters a marital arrangement and demands money to shelter behind the contention that since there was no valid marriage the question of “dowry” does not arise was held to be against the purpose of enacting the provisions, as it encourages harassment of women over demands for money. The absence of a definition of “husband” to specifically include such persons who contract marriages ostensibly and cohabitate with women in a purported exercise of the role and status of a husband was held to be no grounds to exclude them from the purview of penal sections such as 304B or 498A of the IPC.
The judgment declares that a person who enters into a marital relationship and, in the guise of the proclaimed or feigned status of a husband, subjects the woman to cruelty would be covered by the sections dealing with dowry death (304B of the IPC) and subjecting a woman to cruelty for dowry (498A of the IPC) regardless of the issue of the marriage’s legitimacy. Applying the law to the facts of the present case, the Supreme Court sent the matter back to the high court to decide on merit rather than uphold the acquittal under Section 498A on the plea that the prosecution had not established the validity of the marriage between Reema and Anupam.
